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This paper presents a new proposal for understanding the establishment and maintenance
of cooperation: the cooperation afforder with framing hypothesis, producing what can be called
cooperation from afforder-framing. Three key moves are present. First, a special variety of the
Stag Hunt game, the Cooperation Afforder game, will reliably produce mutualistic cooperation
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to meet the special conditions and requirements of the Cooperation Afforder game. Third,
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1 Introduction
The problem of cooperation is not one thing; it is many. Broadly speaking the problem is to
explain and predict cooperative behavior, when it occurs, and failure of cooperation when that
occurs. Further, we wish to support intervention in order to promote or discourage cooperation.
How should we design and manage institutions in order to achieve optimal levels of cooperation?
Add the philosophers’ perennial issue of characterizing the subject: Just what is cooperation? How
does altruism, surely a form of cooperation, differ from other kinds of pro-social behavior? and so
on. Each of these problems spawns multiple sub-problems and varieties.
What makes the subject of cooperation so forcefully problematic is the fact that there seems
to be so much of it, which fact is also without fully satisfactory explanation. Tipping in some
circumstances, helping strangers, and so on are some of many well-known, accepted behaviors that
appear to be highly cooperative, even altruistic. Testimony may be had from many sources as to
the prevalence and puzzlingness of such behavior. To pick just one, here is Michael Tomasello on
altruism:
In the contemporary study of human behavioral evolution, the central problem is altru-
ism, specifically, how it came to be. [SOK: And we might add, how come it has stayed
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around?] There is no widely accepted solution to that question, but there is no shortage
of proposals either. (Tomasello, 2009, page 51)
(The edited volume by Hammerstein (2003) is rich in biological examples.)
In what follows, I wish to add to the list of proposals for the origin and maintenance of coop-
eration, including altruism and other forms of pro-social, or helping, behavior. It is not my aim to
offer a settled explanation of any particular cooperative behavior. Instead, I wish to add a new,
or at least revised, account to the extant list. I want to add a conceptual tool to the resources of
empirical science. Uses and tests of the tool must perforce follow later, although I shall in passing
present some evidence.
The argument I want to make, or the story I want to tell, comes in several steps, beginning in
the next section. In preparation I’ll address two issues quickly.
1.1 Definitions
First, what counts as cooperation, altruism, pro-social behavior, helping, and so on? There are
problems with trying to answer this question fully. The fact is that the relevant terms are commonly
used with varying senses in the literature. To note just two examples, Bronstein (2003, pages 186–7)
writes that
Diverse terms are currently in use to define interspecific cooperative interactions. Some
of these terms have well-accepted alternative meanings, however. Given such inconsis-
tencies, the terminology we choose to employ is more than a strictly semantic matter:
it can determine whether we are all trying to explain the same phenomena. . . .
I use the term mutualism to refer to all mutually beneficial, interspecific interactions,
regardless of their specificity, intimacy, or evolutionary history. . . .
Whereas mutualism [as Bronstein will use the term] denotes two-species beneficial in-
teractions, cooperation has usually been used somewhat more vaguely to denote benefits
in a within-species context. Some researchers have used the terms mutualism and co-
operation interchangeably . . . [and she goes on to note a wide variety of conflicting uses
and senses]
In a footnote to the first occurrence of the term cooperation, Richerson et al. (2003, page 358) write
this:
“Cooperation” has a broad and a narrow definition. The broad definition includes
all forms of mutually beneficial joint action by two or more individuals. The narrow
definition is restricted to situations in which joint action poses a dilemma for at least one
individual such that, at least in the short run, that individual would be better off not
cooperating. . . . The “cooperate” vs. “defect” strategies in the Prisoner’s Dilemma and
Commons games anchor our concept of cooperation, making it more or less equivalent to
the term “altruism” in evolutionary biology. Thus, we distinguish “coordination” (joint
interactions that are “self-policing” because payoffs are highest if everyone does the
same thing) and division of labor (joint action in which payoffs are highest if individuals
do different things) from cooperation.
Even a more ordinary word such as exploitation can be problematic because it has (at least)
the senses of “putting to good use” and “taking unfair or immoral advantage of”. For example,
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Bronstein (see above) writes of “reciprocal exploitation (i.e., mutualism)” (Bronstein, 2003, page
191) which she contrasts with “unilateral exploitation,” which itself may or may not be particularly
harmful to the exploited party.
A further impediment to any attempt to finalize the relevant definitions is that the list of
relevant terms is growing, with no apparent natural end point in view. At a minimum we need also
to consider mutualism, reciprocity, pseudoreciprocity, indirect reciprocity, by-product mutualism,
kin selection, and reciprocal altruism.
The notion has been raised that perhaps our language is inadequate to the phenomena, and
that we would be well-advised to focus primarily on describing kinds of phenomena that seem to
be relevant and worry later about what to call them (e.g., Leimar and Connor (2003)). I have
considerable sympathy for this advice and intend to follow it here. Nevertheless, some rough
characterization of (some) terms will be useful. Here it is.
Altruism is commonly described as “selfless concern for the welfare of others” and I think
that’s fine as far as it goes. I’d prefer to keep examples, or exemplars, to mind. At the low end,
helping strangers by giving directions and giving to charity I’ll take as (normally) counting. The
agent freely provides—transfers—something of value without expectation of any immediate or very
specific reward. I’ll call this altruism in the small. At the high end, of course, are taking big risks
to save someone else or even sacrificing one’s life for another. I’ll call this altruism in the large. Of
course, altruism may not itself be one thing (I’m inclined to think it isn’t), and its nature is itself
contested. Some theorize that apparent altruism is often (always?) discretely selfish. I want to
move on and leave these questions for some other time. Roughly, I’ll take as altruistic any behavior
that benefits someone else without any immediate prospect in sight of commensurate benefit for
the giver.
I’ll use cooperation approximately in the broad sense of Richerson et al. (2003, page 358, see
above), which I take to be essentially the same as mutualism in Bronstein’s sense Bronstein (2003,
pages 186, see above), but with a relaxation to allow more than two individuals and to allow
intraspecific interactions. And I’ll use pro-social and helping interchangeably to include both co-
operation and altruism, as well as anything else that is arguably similar but not similar enough to
count as one or the other, such as strong reciprocity (Fehr and Henrich, 2003).
1.2 Extant Proposals
The second housekeeping issue before I begin the argument directly is the list of extant proposals
for explaining pro-social behavior. A number of kinds of explanations for the establishment and
maintenance of cooperation or altruism have been put forward. Sometimes called evolutionary
pathways to cooperation (Henrich and Henrich, 2007, page 40), among others, they include:
• kin selection
Cooperation, even altruism, among relatives is favored by selection because they share the
same genes ((Wilson, 2000) or any standard text on evolution).
• reciprocal altruism
The cooperation and altruism that is selected for is conditioned on reciprocity by the indi-
vidual receiving the benefits of the cooperative or altruistic behavior ((Wilson, 2000) or any
standard text on evolution).
• group selection
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While is it individually deleterious be be altruistic, the trait is preserved in populations
because populations in which the trait is prevalent out-compete populations in which it is not
(Sober and Wilson, 1998).
• culture
Norms of cooperation are promoted and enforced by cultural institutions (Richerson and
Boyd, 2005).
• bounded rationality
Cooperation, even altruism, is due to the side-effects of imperfectly-rational heuristics which
on balance are individually favorable and favored by selection (Gigerenzer and Selten, 2001).
• sexual selection
Males (typically) compete for mating access to females, and may be selected because of their
cooperative behaviors ((Wilson, 2000) or any standard text on evolution).
• social selection
A generalization of sexual selection in which competition is for contribution to the entire
reproductive process, not merely mating (Roughgarden, 2009).
• selective investment theory
Cooperative behavior is an investment, which if applied effectively will be advantageous on
straightforward darwinian grounds (Brown and Brown, 2006).
• pseudoreciprocity
A helps B because B’s flourishing is itself helpful to A (Dugatkin, 1997, circa page 49).
• indirect reciprocity
A helps B because it will lead to someone else, a C, helping A (Nowak and Sigmund, 2005).
• by-product mutualism
Mutualism maintained by selfish behavior that incidentally benefits others (Mann et al., 2000,
circa page 202).
These pathways, causes of cooperation, are not mutually exclusive. Determination of the actual
mix present is an empirical question and likely very much depends upon the particulars of the case
at hand.
A final comment for now. We can distinguish between proximal and distal explanations of pro-
social behavior. Some of the pathways to helping behavior are best understood as one more than
the other. For example, reputation (a form of indirect reciprocity), social norms, ethnicity (Henrich
and Henrich, 2007, page 32) and “identity economics” (Akerlof and Kranton, 2000, 2005, 2010) are
proximal explanations of cooperative behavior. What explains why we rely on reputation effects to
modify our behavior or why we value “identities” and rely on them to support cooperative behavior?
These are questions that call for distal, presumably evolutionary and/or cultural explanations.
Now to the story to hand. The reader may judge the extent to which it differs from existing
explanations.
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2 The Cooperation Afforder Game
It will help to set the scene. Imagine a tribe of hunter-gathers in a primitive state of development,
compared to modern humans. In particular there is little or no supporting apparatus, technology,
or even cultural practices useful to the individuals jointly as they go out and hunt for food. There
are in short little in the way of cooperation afforders for the hunt, things that make possible and
support cooperation in the hunt.1 In consequence, there is no joint gain to be made from pairwise
cooperation. Everyone hunts hare, as it were, and there are no available alternatives. Into this
situation comes a new afforder with the property that it affords cooperation between two individuals
if they both have and use this afforder. Think of it perhaps as a net that must be held by two people
for it to work in catching a stag, but the net must be assembled from two components, one brought
to the field by each of the two hunters. Further, let us assume that the cost of bringing a single
component to the field is small but real; the afforder is not free. More on all of this later. For
concreteness, let the strategic situation be as in Figure 1.
C D
C (2,2) (0.99, 1)
D (1, 0.99) (1, 1)
Figure 1: Cooperation Afforder game, standard payoffs
Think of the payoffs as being given in days of food harvested. If an agent has the afforder (and
uses it), we call this the C or cooperative strategy; if not then this is the D or defecting strategy.
Under our standard payoffs (Figure 1), two cooperating agents will harvest each two days of food.
Two defecting agents will each harvest one day of food. When a cooperating agent plays with a
defecting agent, the cooperator harvests a day of food minus a small cost of bringing the afforder
to the field, while the defecting agent gets the day of food without the extra cost.
The upshot is that we have a kind of Stag Hunt game. Brian Skyrms has, very commendably,
brought the general Stag Hunt game forcefully to our attention. He has explored general Stag Hunt
games and documented the problems of achieving sustained cooperation in them (Skyrms, 2001,
2004).
The so-called replicator dynamics is a standard model for investigating the behavior of games
such as Stag Hunt under evolution by natural selection (Taylor and Jonker, 1978; Hofbauer and
Sigmund, 1998). Skyrms, with others, uses this model. In its discrete form (generations are dis-
crete) the frequency of an element (here, a strategy, either C or D) in the next generation, p(si)′
(probability of strategy si in the next generation) equals its frequency in the current generation,
p(si), plus the difference between its average performance, or return, r, and that of the entire
population ((r(si)− r(si)), weighted by is current frequency. That is:
p(si)′ = p(si) + p(si) · (r(si)− r(si)) (1)
Thus, if the average return of strategy si is higher than the average of the averages of all the
individual strategies (all the sis in the population), then the frequency of si increases in the next
generation; and if not, not.
1I choose the term afforder with allusion to Donald Norman’s use of the term affordance (Norman, 2002). A
design, in Norman’s usage, provides certain affordances, things we can have or do because of the design. By the term
afforder, I simply mean that which affords something, so a design is an afforder and what it affords is an affordance.
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1. Preparatory steps:
(a) Determine populationSize, the population size to be used.
(b) Determine the game, G, with its payoffs, and the available strategies, S.
(c) Determine fInitial, the initial frequency distribution of strategies from S.
(d) Determine sampleSize, the number of pairwise games to be play each generation.
(e) Create the initial population of populationSize strategies drawn from fInitial.
(f) Create and set to 0 reward accumulators, r(si), for each strategy si ∈ S.
2. Process generations until done:
(a) Do sampleSize times:
i. Draw two members of the population at random, noting their types (which strategy
they are).
ii. Play the two members against each other in the game G; allocate the outcome
rewards to their respective strategies, r(si).
(b) Determine fNext, the frequency distribution of strategies for the next generation, as
fNext(si) =
r(si)∑
i r(si)
(2)
(c) Create the next generation population of populationSize strategies drawn from fNext.
(d) Set to 0 the reward accumulators, r(si), for each strategy si ∈ S.
Figure 2: Pseudocode for the discrete generation replicator dynamics with a finite population
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Figure 2 presents pseudocode for calculating the distribution of strategies, as it changes over
discrete generations, with a finite population. It is this process that I shall use, or that has been
used, to generate the results to be described. It is slightly different from the equational form,
expression (1), but the results are not materially different.
C D
C (3, 3) (0, 2)
D (2, 0) (1, 1)
Figure 3: Stag Hunt, standard payoffs
With the payoff regimes Skyrms has typically handled, e.g., Figure 3, it is indeed quite possible
for evolution in the form of the replicator dynamics to drive a population to all D, depending on
initial conditions. For example, for the game of Figure 3 and a start of Cs and Ds in equal numbers,
the normal result is conquest by Ds. Herein lies a puzzle for cooperation, as Skyrms has emphasized.
How is it that cooperation can get started in the first place?
C D
C (R,R) (N − c, N)
D (N, N − c) (N, N)
Figure 4: Cooperation Afforder game, abstracted. R: reward for cooperation. N : payoff for no
afforder. c: (small) cost of the afforder. R > N > c > 0.
The Cooperation Afforder game, abstracted in Figure 4, is (technically) a Stag Hunt (or Assur-
ance) game because it is symmetric and R > N > N − c. According to classical game theory, only
the ordering of R, N and N − c payoffs matter, not their magnitudes. But not for us. Our concern
is with evolution and other causal processes, not with what happens under some a-causal theory of
ideal rationality (as in classical game theory). So payoff magnitudes do matter. Under the replica-
tor dynamics for the game in Figure 1, so long as the frequency of Cs is at or above about 2–3%,
the population will reliably evolve to all Cs. With balking, multiple rounds of play and reactive
strategies, etc., starting frequencies of less than 2% for Cs can reliably result in conquest by cooper-
ators.These are empirical claims, arrived at using ReplicatorDynamicsWithBalking.nlogo, but they
are robust. Figure 5 shows ReplicatorDynamicsWithBalking.nlogo set up to run the Cooperation
Afforder game with initially 3% cooperators, shown as black small squares. The defectors are white
small squares. After a number of generations, on the order of 75, the defectors (represented by
white squares) will be eliminated. The entire population will consist of cooperators.2
These tests were with large populations, of about 95,000 individuals. With small populations
it is quite plausible that strategy C could appear and “drift” to a large enough frequency that its
selective advantage would come into play and drive the population to all C, and then drive the
population to expand at the expense of populations without the afforder.
There are three key properties of the Cooperation Afforder game that afford the evolution of
cooperation.
1. There are substantial benefits to be had from cooperation.
2To run the ReplicatorDynamicsWithBalking.nlogo program, point your Java-enabled browser to http://opim.
wharton.upenn.edu/~sok/agebook/applications/nlogo/41/ and open up ReplicatorDynamicsWithBalking.html.
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Figure 5: ReplicatorDynamicsWithBalking.nlogo set up for a run of the Cooperation Afforder game,
starting with 3% cooperators and balking and mutation off.
For example, in the Cooperation Afforder game with standard payoffs, Figure 1, two days of
food from mutual cooperation is substantially better than one day of food when not cooper-
ating.
2. Unrequited cooperation is not very costly.
It is not free, but neither is it immediately life-threatening to offer cooperation and not have
it reciprocated. In terms of our example, the fitness loss is low enough, compared to the
benefits of cooperation, that even relatively rare encounters with fellow cooperators will pay
for the cost of the carrying the afforder.
3. Unrequited cooperation is not exploitable.
When one agent cooperates and the other defects, the defecting agent gains no positive benefit
of any size. There is a fitness loss by the cooperating agent, but the fitness gain (relatively) is
divided among all of the non-cooperators. The non-cooperating counterpart in question has no
idiosyncratic gain. The replicator dynamics calculations (simulations) with the Cooperation
Afforder game are simply a concrete, specific way to demonstrate this.
Under these general conditions, which are not specific to the Cooperation Afforder game, we
should expect cooperation (often) to be favored by evolution and/or by learning. Put otherwise,
when these conditions obtain, we are able to answer the question of how cooperation can get started
and then be maintained. Broadly speaking, these conditions suffice for cooperation.
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3 Name that Technology
The upshot of the previous section is that there is no fundamental impediment to understanding how
a cooperation afforder could conquer a population and a species via something like the Cooperation
Afforder game. This naturally raises the questions of what afforder or afforders could, or even did,
play this rôle. Does evolution have to find anew every form of cooperation or is there a more general
cooperation afforder? And so on. To address these questions and to motivate my general answer,
I want to take a brief digression.
3.1 Hi-Lo
Consider for concreteness a simple, no-conflict, even trivial game represented in strategic form:
H L
H 2, 2 0, 0
L 0, 0 1, 1
(a) Standard form
H L
H A, A 0, 0
L 0, 0 B, B
(b) Generic form
Figure 6: Hi-Lo, after Bacharach (2006). Assumed: A > B.
The game is called Hi-Lo, for obvious reasons, and is an example of an inessential game, a type
normally passed over with dismissal because it is so trivial (Rapoport et al., 1976, page 22). Notably
and commendably, Bacharach (2006) disagrees and discusses it at length. I agree with much of his
analysis, but would depart considerably from elements of it. These matters, however, do not matter
for the present.
Any simple equilibrium account of Hi-Lo (or indeed Stag Hunt), such as classical game theory,
will fail for definiteness in the presence of multiple equilibria, and the classical account fails for that
reason here.3
Nash equilibrium fails to confer determinacy anyway, so there is no need to dispute the
principle in order to show that standard theory [that is, classical game theory] fails for
Hi-Lo. (Bacharach, 2006, page 61)
But things get worse. The theoretical problem of multiple equilibria is exacerbated in the case
of Hi-Lo because the practical problem is utterly unproblematic. People’s behavior and all our
intuitions agree that playing H is the rational thing to do. The theoretical challenge is to explain
why—descriptively, in practice—it is unproblematic to play high, H. Bacharach puts it nicely.
You are to play Hi-Lo, and it is common knowledge that you and your coplayer are
intelligent people. It seems quite obvious that you should choose A [H in our Figure
6]. However, the question why it seems obvious, and the related question of why people
almost always do choose A [H], have turned out to be anything but easy to answer.
(Bacharach, 2006, page 35)
3Bacharach is aware of (Harsanyi and Selten, 1988) and related work on equilibrium refinement, which neither he
nor I think succeeds in eliminating the paradox. See (Bacharach, 2006) for a discussion, which would take us too far
afield.
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This is the paradox, the Hi-Lo paradox of classical game theory. Game theory should, one would
think, easily be able to offer a satisfying account of why players will coordinate on Hi in Hi-Lo,
but it does not. Game theory should, one would think, also easily be able to offer a satisfying
prescriptive account of why players should play Hi in Hi-Lo, but again it does not. We now turn
to the essentials of Bacharach’s alternative account.
In a nutshell, Bacharach observes that classical game theory presumes individual thinking, in
which each of the playing agents asks of itself What is it best for me to do in this situation?
Unfortunately for classical game theory, there is no determinate answer to this question via the
theory. That is the point of the Hi-Lo paradox. As a way out of the paradox Bacharach proposes
a different framing: team thinking. A team thinking agent, confronted by a strategic decision
problem asks instead What is it best for my team to do and what is my rôle in it? Having answered
these questions, the agent follows through by enacting its rôle in what on balance it judges is best
for the team to be doing.4
Credible examples of team reasoning come easily to mind in the case of team sports. Two players
perceive an opportunity for the team and perceive that the other shares the perception. They then
spontaneously coordinate their actions. Simultaneously, one throws the ball to a spot and the other
runs towards the spot. This happens, has to happen, too quickly for the players to signal each
other and agree. They act autonomously on what they see and very often will achieve effective
coordination. Ordinary life is rich in activities that will often be best understood as evidencing
team reasoning by their members. These include group hunting, rowing, dancing, singing, military
activity, and various forms of work (McNeill, 1995). On the last, McNeill thinks we see this not
only in gangs of laborers, but in the efforts of modern corporations to instill company spirit through
propaganda and (in Japan) calisthenics.
Bacharach’s view is that coordination in Hi-Lo works similarly, but of course in quotidian
interactions where it hardly requires the skills of professional sports players. The story is that
the agents see the game (perceive the situation), are cued for team thinking, reason—trivially—
that what is good for the team is for each player to play H, and end by . . . playing H.
If the players are in fact engaging in team reasoning (or something like it), it is a virtue of this
account that we can easily explain and predict what should be obvious, coordination on H, but is
unexplained entirely by individual thinking and classical game theory. End of digression.
3.2 Pro-Social Framing
The thesis, the explanatory path to cooperation, I wish to put on the table employs a version of, or
something like, Bacharach’s account of team reasoning. There are several parts to the thesis. Here
are the first few.
1. Causation. Pro-social frames, or framing, once present in a population could, by the argu-
ment above with regard to the Cooperation Afforder game, evolve to domination or fixation
in a population.5
4There are many complications possible which for present purposes need not detain us. For example, what if the
agent thinks that some of the other team members cannot discern or enact their rôles? See Bacharach (2006) for
discussion of some of the related nuances.
5Frames for Bacharach and in the other literature I discuss are alternate ways of organizing experience. One might
speak of them as collections of presuppositions, which are used to direct action, arrive at new beliefs, and so on. So
we might think of frames as collections of beliefs and a framing effect as something believed or done in consequence
of a particular collection of beliefs. But this is not necessary. Frames may organize experience without recourse to
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2. Behavior. There exist frames of thinking, among them, prominently, a selfish, self-centered
frame and a pro-social frame. Individuals using their pro-social frames will tend to behave
cooperatively, even altruistically. In a team thinking frame, individuals identify with the team
and predicate their actions on their estimates of what they should do for the good of the team.
In short, pro-social framing is an afforder whose proliferation may be explained straightforwardly on
evolutionary grounds. I submit this as a candidate for explaining, or contributing to the explanation
of, many cooperative phenomena. Call it the cooperation afforder hypothesis with framing for
explaining cooperative phenomena. Cooperation that comes about and is maintained in virtue of
the process hypothesized may be called afforder-framing cooperation.
The existence point—that there are both selfish and pro-social frames of thinking—is not a new
idea. It goes by different names from different authors, who may or may not cite each other.6 The
idea has been in the air. Here is a recent representative passage.
In shared cooperative activities, we have a joint goal that creates an interdependence
among us—indeed, creates an “us.” If we are carrying a table to the bedroom, I cannot
simply drop it and run off without hurting us and our goal. In shared cooperative
activities, my individual rationality—I want to transport the table to the bedroom so
I should do X—is transformed into a social rationality of interdependence: we want to
transport the table to the bedroom, so I should do X and you should do Y. (Tomasello,
2009, page 41)
The case I am making is not very specific regarding the details of the pro-social afforder and
associated framing. Intendedly so; I’m making a basic point. There is much remaining to do by
way of modeling and empirical investigation. I note in passing, however, several features commonly
identified with pro-social framing (we-mode thinking, team thinking, etc.):
1. Shared goals. The agent directs its activities towards fulfilling the goals of the team, group,
society.
2. Imitation. The agent emulates and conforms to, insofar as feasible, characteristic behaviors
of members of the group (society).
3. Enforcement. The agent undertakes to enforce norms of conformance. Defectors from the
group are to be punished.
I wish to suggest, either alternatively or in addition (let the facts reign), another afforder as a
key player, one that complements and abets cooperative framing and team reasoning. The afforder
is communication and again Brian Skyrms has broken important ground in exploring the subject
(Skyrms, 2010). The ability to communicate, even in a rudimentary way, will plausibly often have
scope to instantiate the three key properties of the Cooperation Afforder game:
anything directly propositional, for example by using a procedure to interpret sensory signals. The account I am
giving here, and the accounts given by others employing framing, are mostly neutral with regard to how frames are
built and to how framing effects result from them. This said, it is unlikely that frames are fundamentally propositional
or doxastic. In the end, the issue is an empirical one whose resolution is of peripheral consequences for the case I am
making.
6 Tomasello (2009) cites philosophers: Nagel (1979), ?, Gilbert (1992), Searle (1997) and Tuomela (2007) who
earlier introduced the terms I-mode thinking and we-mode thinking, corresponding roughly to individual and team
thinking. Tomasello does not, however, cite economists and game theorists, e.g., Bacharach (2006), Sugden as in
Mehta et al. (1994); Sugden (2008), and Colman as in Colman et al. (2008a). Nor do they cite the philosophers or
the biologists.
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1. There are substantial benefits to be had from cooperation.
The potential benefits of cooperation have to be provided, exogenously as it were, by a
combination of the environment and the agents’ needs and other capabilities. If these are such
that with cooperation abetted by communication would in fact pay well, then cooperation
may well ensue.
2. Unrequited cooperation is not too costly.
We are not safe in assuming that the act of communication is free, especially considering
the requisite apparatus for being able to communicate. Given the apparatus, however, the
energetic costs of signaling are surely low, or often can be.
3. Unrequited cooperation is not exploitable.
If the target of the communicative act does not reciprocate with cooperation, there is, or
can be, little strategic cost to the sender. This may happen because the target fails to
understand or in some other way to have uptake of the message. The target might have
perfectly adequate uptake, but choose to ignore the message. What is being excluded, for
the Cooperation Afforder game to apply, is that the target of the communication is able to
use the message to its advantage and to the disadvantage of the sender, say by signaling a
third party and effectively denying the original sender access to the resource. Of course it can
happen that unrequited cooperation is exploitable and is exploited. The suggestion here is
that this can be a rare enough eventuality that the conditions for the Cooperation Afforder
game do in fact generally apply.
Note in this regard Grice on communication and the important rôle of the cooperation principle
(Grice, 1967). Communication in Grice’s analysis presumes cooperation and to violate the rule of
cooperation is to abuse the institution. Could it be that a propensity for pro-social framing afforded
the development of communication and even reinforced the propensity?
4 Evidence
I will be brief, given the intended scope of this paper, which is to present an evolutionary pathway
to cooperation, as a candidate for explaining phenomena. It is beyond the scope of this paper to
establish this pathway—the cooperation afforder hypothesis—as the explanation of anything.
The cooperation afforder hypothesis can explain, or help explain, the presence of something on
the order of team thinking, we-mode thinking, shared cooperative activity thinking. Whether it
is uniquely qualified to do so is beyond the scope of this paper. Little or nothing really rides on
whether that is the case. The more urgent question, I suggest, is whether there is in fact evidence for
something on the order of team thinking, we-mode thinking, shared cooperative activity thinking.
Do we indeed have the two distinct modes of thinking, one pro-individual, one pro-social?
We do. I’ll cite some of the indirect and direct evidence. On the indirect side, the presence of
framing and framing effects in human psychology is very well established. Richard Gregory (1997,
2009) has made us well aware of visual illusions. What we see depends on how see, how we frame
things. The effect occurs outside of vision and even perception. We see it in our conceptualizing
of the world. This is, I take it, a main point Wittgenstein was after in his duck-rabbit discussions.
The observation is an ancient one. Is Antigone’s opposition to Creon a defiance of law and duty
to her fellow citizens or is it a noble display of fidelity to and honoring of her dead brother? The
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frames, the presuppositions, of Antigone and Creon conflict with tragic upshot. The effect is often
present in moral dilemmas, but has been established in many contexts and is well accepted in the
psychology literature (Tversky and Kahneman, 1981). So, the indirect point is that we see framing
effects all over and should not be surprised to find one more.
Direct experimental evidence for team reasoning in Hi-Lo and related games is also available,
although only a few controlled experiments have been reported. Team reasoning in Hi-Lo is espe-
cially difficult to explore experimentally because there is no variation to work with: everyone always
picks H. Similar games can be designed, however, that do not elicit successful team coordination
universally. Subjects may then be cued with team-promoting or individual-promoting messages and
we may expect, if the team reasoning hypothesis is correct, that team-cued subjects would achieve
coordination more often than individual-cued subjects. In experiments of this sort Colman et al.
(2008a,b) convincingly do find support for the team reasoning hypothesis.
More or less direct evidence of another sort is available from the literature on friendship, recently
reviewed by Silk (2003). To summarize, her money quote is: “Friendship is not mutualism” (Silk,
2003, page 47). Silk’s concept of mutualism is, unlike Bronstein’s, tied to near-term reciprocity,
which requires close bookkeeping that is absent in friendships. She puts her point as follows.
Taken together these experiments provide empirical support for the distinction between
exchange and communal relationships. More importantly, they support the hypothesis
that communal relationships are not based on strict Tit-for-Tat reciprocity. People use
Tit-for-Tat reciprocity as a diagnostic criteria for the existence of close friendships; when
benefits are balanced directly, relationships are assumed to casual and ephemeral [i.e.,
exchange rather than communal]. People seem to make concerted efforts to obscure
the accounting of costs and benefits among their friends—in joint tasks, they hide their
own contributions and avoiding [sic] monitoring their friends’ contributions. (Silk, 2003,
page 46)
Continuing, she writes,
. . . the exchange-communal distinction implies that the process that preserves the bal-
ance in these two different kind [sic] of relationships differs. In exchange relationships,
help is given with the explicit expectation that it will be reciprocated. In communal
relationships, help is given because it is needed or desired; wehn both partners have
the same communal orientation, benefits will flow back and forth, but they will not be
strictly contingent on expectations of future benefits. (Silk, 2003, page 46)
The suggestion I want to make is that communal thinking is much the same as team thinking,
perhaps a generalization of it. In any case, it is a form of framing, which can be and is escaped by
experiences, just not by comparatively small deviations from strict reciprocity. Team thinking and
communal thinking make us more patient.
We should regard the existence of framing and effects thereof as reasonably well established.
Further, we should see the existence of something on the order of team reasoning, we-mode thinking,
communal thinking, et cetera as a credible hypothesis, one to be investigated further.
Before beginning to generalize the argument, in the following section, it may be helpful to
rehearse in compressed form the argument, or perhaps narrative is a better term, so far.
1. The Cooperation Afforder game is a model that may be useful in explaining the origin and
maintenance of cooperation in some cases. Calculations with the model demonstrate how a
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low-cost, reasonably high-benefit afforder of mutual cooperation could evolve to fixation in a
population, once it appeared even in very small numbers.
2. Given the model and its interesting property of explaining the fixation of cooperation, we
would like to know how accurately it tracks relevant aspects of the real world. That is a very
large question, one that I am not attempting to dispose of in this paper. Weaker, but still
very important questions are
(a) Are there credible candidates for the role of cooperation afforder?
(b) If there are credible candidates, what does this tell us about further consequences of the
narrative?
3. I take up question (2b) in §5, question (2a) immediately below.
4. Regarding question (2a), candidates that are very specific to particular circumstances are less
interesting and less credible as sources for the high level of cooperativeness we find about us.
The Cooperation Afforder game may explain the fixation of several afforders, but it would
be a stretch to ask it to explain hundreds of them (e.g., one for hunting animals, another for
hunting fish, another for farming, and so on).
5. Uncooperative behavior, the propensity to act in terms of one’s perceived selfish interests,
without regard to the interests of one’s group, is a behavior that has not been seen to be
problematic from an evolutionary perspective.
6. The Cooperation Afforder model teaches us that a propensity to act in terms of the interests
of one’s group (of 2 so far) is, under certain circumstances (not too costly, etc.), also not
problematic from an evolutionary perspective.
7. So there are (at least) two possible propensities, one for selfish behavior and one for cooperative
behavior.
(a) Do we need both to explain the phenomena?
(b) If so, how do they work and what are their properties?
8. Regarding (7a), the question of whether we need both propensities, that we do has prima facie
support from the evident fact, very broadly accepted, that there is a lot of selfish behavior
and a lot of cooperative behavior. We can of course try to eliminate the need for one or the
other, and this is what some of the paths to cooperation (above, §1.2) try to do. The exercise
here is, in part, one of offering a kind of explanation that would serve to buttress the need
for both selfish and cooperative propensities. Recall as well Bacharach’s argument, discussed
above in §3.1, that the behavior universally found for the Hi-Lo game cannot be explained
with the assumed selfish propensity of contemporary game theory.
9. Regarding (7b), the question of how these propensities work, the suggestion to hand is that
they are, or operate like, the cognitive frames we are familiar with and that have received
considerable evidential support quite independently of the issues immediately before us. If
not quite evidence, this is an attractive property of the suggestion.
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10. Cognitive frames are considered to be cued by experiences and once in place the agent operates
with them effectively as presuppositions. Additional experience may cause a frame in use to be
replaced by another. Sometimes, as with certain optical illusions, frames are easily displaced.
In other cases, such as with friendships, frames not so easily displaced; they may be said to
be sticky.
Given the evolutionary argument for the fixation and maintenance of a mutualistic propensity for
cooperative behavior, and the hypothesis that the cognitive basis for this relies on reasonably sticky
framing, what else can we explain? I take up this question in the next section.
5 Ramifications: On Beyond Cooperation?
The Cooperation Afforder game models the capacity for two-player mutualistic cooperation spread-
ing and becoming established in a population. How do we get from this to an explanation of
altruistic behavior, of contributing to public goods, and in general of defaulting to cooperative,
even altruistic behavior? It is these behaviors that are indeed most in need of explaining.
If what evolves or is learned that supports cooperation is specific to context, goals, and so on,
it is indeed hard to see how this would generalize to other circumstances. If what we acquire is a
particular ability to cooperate in hunting stag, why would it apply elsewhere? There is little reason
to expect altruistic donation to the Red Cross, in consequence of cooperation in Stag Hunt.
The first thing to notice is that there is nothing in the Cooperation Afforder game account that
requires cooperation be limited to two agents. If teams of agents, of communicating, communal-
reasoning agents, find opportunities for cooperative behavior in which the costs of offering cooper-
ation a low and cannot be exploited, then we can expect groups of cooperators to thrive.
Further, I want to add another part of the cooperation afforder with framing hypothesis. I call
it the principle of imperfect specificity.
1. Causation. Pro-social frames, or framing, once present in a population could, by the argu-
ment above with regard to the Cooperation Afforder game, evolve to domination or fixation
in a population.
2. Behavior. There exist frames of thinking, among them, prominently, a selfish, self-centered
frame and a pro-social frame. Individuals using their pro-social frames will tend to behave
cooperatively, even altruistically.
3. Imperfect specificity. Pro-social frames will compete within (and among) agents with pro-
individual frames. They may, in many cases, prove to be of superior value to pro-individual
frames.
Consider the explanation for play in Hi-Lo. The player sees and understands the game, goes into
team reasoning mode, reasons that its job is to play H, and plays H. The pattern is:
1. Perceive a situation calling for action.
2. Be cued into pro-social thinking in some form.
3. Arrive at an action from the presumed framework and assumptions of pro-social thinking.
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The suggestion here is that given a frame, ordinary thinking is all that is required for action, but
different frames will lead to different actions because different assumptions are being made. Once a
frame is available that supports collaborative activity, cooperation, et cetera, the agent may acquire
cues for that frame that are different from those originally calling it up. Further, because cues are
always imperfect, there will be a tendency to apply the frame in new situations. In short, a pro-
social frame, if available, will compete to be cued with a pro-individual frame. And if the rewards
are superior it will tend to be used.
And what might make pro-social frames out-compete pro-individual frames in contexts beyond
simple mutualism? Sexual selection is an obvious source (hypothetically).7 It is not much of a
stretch to imagine that, very relevantly in our evolutionary history, a male conspicuously exhibiting
pro-social behavior would be especially attractive to females because of the prospect of contributing
to raising the children. (Roughgarden (2009) makes a similar point about sexual selection in birds.
I don’t believe any generalized pro-social framing is envisioned, however; it is not necessary for
contributing to brood support.)
Punishment is a second possible source. If a pro-social frame includes a propensity to imitate
others in the group, to conform to the group’s behavior, and to punish those who do not, we should
not be surprised if this frame pervades a given group. If in addition the cooperation so induced
is productive, the group may be expected to grow and to out-compete groups without the frame.
Support for this kind of story may be found in (Boyd and Richerson, 1992) originally; see (Henrich
and Henrich, 2007) for an updated treatment.
I’ll mention one other source; there are others: transaction costs. The reason there is imperfect
specificity (at least in part) is that it is too expensive (or even impossible) to maintain an apparatus
that is highly accurate in discriminating when to and when not to engage in communal thinking and
communication, that is to engage one’s cooperation afforder. In consequence we may often engage
in seemingly altruistic behavior—tipping in places not to be visited again, helping strangers, and
so on—as a default, which is not overridden by careful scrutiny and calculation. If the opportunity
cost is low (Just how much richer would you be if you always refused to give directions when asked
by a stranger?) and you live in a society in which others mostly have made similar cost-benefit
tradeoffs, then neither learning nor natural selection may disfavor it. The alternative is simply too
costly for the available benefit.
This kind of argument may go far to account for altruism in the small. As for altruism in the
large, we should expect less of it. Even so, kin selection plus imperfect specificity may account for
some cases, as surely must catastrophic errors that occur so rarely that, again, imperfect specificity
rules because the alternatives are themselves too expensive.
6 Conclusion
To summarize, here is the mode of explanation I want to offer for explaining some forms of pro-
social, helping behavior.
1. The Cooperation Afforder game (in conjunction with the replicator dynamics) teaches us that
a low-cost afforder that supports cooperation and avoids exploitation could, once it appeared
even in small numbers, evolve to dominance and even fixation in a population.
7Or social selection in Roughgarden’s sense (Roughgarden, 2009).
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2. If the afforder acquired from such a process were a generalized ability to engage in pro-social
thinking (and perhaps communication), this afforder would inevitably be tried in circum-
stances beyond those originally occasioning it.
3. There are plausible circumstances in which pro-social thinking would out-compete pro-individual
thinking, and in consequence be reinforced.
4. A cooperation afforder (including a generalized ability to engage in pro-social thinking and
communication) could also grow and be maintained in a population due to its uses in situations
that are (somewhat) exploitable.
Although agents might in principle have incentive to defect in many circumstances from pro-
social thinking, the monitoring and discrimination costs may well be prohibitive and/or the
frequency of exploitation by counterparts may be low.
5. This process may explain much altruistic behavior. In the small, agents are simply relying
on an imperfect heuristic—pro-social thinking—that is generally, usually successful in the cir-
cumstances as understood. In the large, catastrophic mistakes in very unusual circumstances
are also subject to the logic of cost-benefit tradeoffs for monitoring and discrimination.
The picture, then, is this. Pro-social framing is (with communication) a cooperation afforder that in
many circumstances is directly favored by selection and/or learning. It is a heuristic that has been
supported by evolution and learning. In consequence, humans pervasively adopt it as the default
stance in social encounters, although we can, and do, learn to recognize exceptions. Often, what
looks like (or simply is?) altruism is an unexcepted application of a pro-social framing heuristic.
This picture fits nicely with several well-established bodies of experimental findings.
1. Human infants, beginning as early as 14 months, spontaneously exhibit helping behavior.
The effects are quite remarkable and have been documented by Tomasello and his group (see
(Tomasello, 2009) for an overview).8
2. Humans as adults robustly display strong reciprocity, that is “people willingly repay gifts and
punish the violation of cooperation and fairness norms even in anonymous one-shot encounters
with genetically unrelated strangers” (see Fehr and Henrich (2003, page 55), who also provide
a useful review of the data).
3. In the well-known Dictator game, one of two agents is given the power to decide on a split
of an amount of money. This is played as a one-shot game between anonymous counterparts.
Typically, the dictator allocates a non-trivial amount of money to the counterpart, who must
accept the dictator’s decision. Under the assumptions of classical game theory and economics,
the dictator should always appropriate the entire amount, leaving nothing for the counterpart.
Interpreted in light of the cooperation afforder hypothesis, allocating a non-trivial amount of
money to the counterpart indicates the presence by default of a pro-social framing heuristic
and measures its strength or resistance to being excepted.
4. In the well-known Ultimatum game, one of two agents (the proposer) is given the power to
propose a split of an amount of money and the other agent (the disposer) is given the power
8Perhaps the reader will be struck, as I have been, with the incisive insight revealed in the lyrics of the song
“You’ve Got To Be Carefully Taught” from the musical South Pacific. It would not be the first time that a work of
art has done this.
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to accept or reject the proposal. If the disposer accepts the proposal it is implemented and the
game is over; if the disposer rejects the proposal, the game is over and neither player receives
any portion of the money. Ultimatum is also played as a one-shot game between anonymous
counterparts. Typically, proposers propose a split that allocates a substantial portion (50%
or even more, but more usually in the 20-40% range) of the available fund. Also typically,
disposers reject portions amounting to less than, say, 20% of the fund.
Under the assumptions of classical game theory and economics, the proposer should always
appropriate almost the entire amount, leaving next to nothing for the counterpart, and the
counterpart should always accept such a proposal. Interpreted in light of the cooperation
afforder hypothesis, the disposer’s rejection of ungenerous proposals indicates the presence
by default of a pro-social framing heuristic and measures its strength or resistance to being
excepted. The proposer’s allocating a substantial portion of the fund to the disposer both
indicates the presence by default of a pro-social framing heuristic and measures its strength
or resistance to being excepted, and indicates the proposer’s understanding of the disposer’s
likely frame of thought.9
Now, with the cooperation afforder hypothesis on the table as an evolutionary pathway to
cooperation, we may hope that systematic empirical and modeling investigations will explore it and
its ramifications, including those pertaining to social policy and design.
It is appropriate at this point to remind the reader that cooperation is normatively ambigu-
ous.10 If a finite common resource requires cooperation to exploit it, the account here explains
how cooperation could be supported by evolution (and more generally an evolutionary dynamics)
with the resulting cooperation leading to a tragedy of the commons (Hardin, 1968). Concretely,
exploitation of fossil fuels requires extensive cooperative action, yet it may well lead to destruction
of the earth’s ability to support our species.11
9The literature on both the Dictator game and the Ultimatum game is voluminous. Camerer (2003) provides a
good overview and summary of these games, and of much else that is relevant to the cooperation afforder hypothesis.
10I thank an anonymous reviewer for reminding me to remind the reader.
11An earlier version of this paper was read at the 2010 Philosophy of Social Science Roundtable, meeting in St.
Louis. I am grateful for the ensuing discussion and comments. I also want to acknowledge and thank three anonymous
reviewers for their comments, which were materially useful in improving the clarity of the presentation. Finally, this
research was funded in part by the Wharton-SMU Research Center at Singapore Management University. The
felicitous environment at SMU also aided materially in bringing this work to culmination and I am most grateful for
that.
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